We examine how reduction of search frictions in secondary markets affects the ability of incumbents in primary markets to appropriate value. We argue that the effect depends on the relative strength of the added value and cannibalization effects, which in turn is contingent on the separability of the secondary and primary markets. Consistent with this argument, we show that following the entry of Craigslist, an intermediary facilitating concert ticket transactions, shows by artists with low popularity exhibit a significant decrease in prices, while shows by artists with high popularity exhibit a significant increase in prices. In addition, we find that some promoters actively limit venue capacity in periods following Craigslist's entry.
INTRODUCTION
Market frictions have received growing attention in the Strategy literature in recent years.
Scholars have shown that market frictions lead to firm heterogeneity and can help explain the existence of firms (e.g., Mahoney 2001 Mahoney , 2005 Chatain and Zemsky 2011) . In this paper, we empirically study a specific type of market frictions, search frictions-impediments to buyers and sellers meeting and conducting transactions. We empirically examine how changes in search frictions in secondary markets affect firms' ability to appropriate value in primary markets.
Secondary markets exist in a wide variety of industries including finance, real estate, electronics, books, cars, and many others. Intermediaries in these secondary markets, such as stock exchanges, realtors, and Autotrader magazine, facilitate exchange by matching buyers and sellers. The value of intermediaries to the economy is huge- Spulber (1996) estimates that intermediaries account for about one quarter of the US GDP. The emergence of many online intermediaries has further reduced search and transaction costs for buyers and sellers. For example, eBay and Craigslist serve as intermediaries that connect buyers to sellers for a variety of second-hand products and, in addition to serving as a merchant, Amazon offers a secondary market for third-party sellers to trade with buyers directly. By traffic, all three websites are ranked in the top 10 most visited sites in the US.
1 Tabobao, the largest Chinese B2B Internet intermediary, reportedly does over $150B a year in transactions.
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Intermediaries in secondary markets help firms better create and capture value by reducing search frictions (Spulber 1996 , Mahoney 2005 , Mahoney and Qian 2012 and by filling institutional voids (Khanna and Palepu 1999 , Ricart et al 2004 . Entry by additional intermediaries into secondary markets creates competition between intermediaries which can result in additional value creation and capture by upstream firms that sell goods into these markets (Ryall and MacDonald 2004) . The reduction of search frictions due to entry of intermediaries may also affect the upstream firms differently (Chatain and Zemsky 2011) .
In this paper, we set out to explain which types of upstream firms benefit most from the reduction of frictions due to entry of additional intermediaries in secondary markets. We begin by characterizing the two effects on upstream firms caused by entry of intermediaries in downstream secondary markets. The first effect we call the "added value" effect. Customers'
willingness to pay for a good might be lower if the customers are concerned that they will not get the full use of the good. For example, a potential purchaser of a house might be dissuaded because of the possibility that her job will require her to move. If the customer knows she can recover a substantial portion of her investment by reselling the home, however, she may be more willing to make the purchase. For this reason, the existence of secondary markets can raise the willingness-to-pay of buyers in the primary market (e.g., Hendel and Lizzeri 1999, Chevalier and Goolsbee 2009) . This is beneficial for the primary market firm because it means that the primary market sale actually creates more value, hence our use of the term "added value," which draws from the value-based strategy tradition (e.g., Brandenburger and Stuart 1996 , Adner and Zemsky 2006 , Brandenburger and Stuart 2007 .
The second effect we call the "cannibalization" effect. Secondary markets can be detrimental to a firm if they force the firm to compete against earlier versions of its own product (e.g. : Coase 1972 , Bulow 1982 , Ghose, Telang and Krishnan 2005 . If products on the secondary market are a good enough substitute for new goods on the primary market, resellers in the secondary market effectively become competition for the primary good seller 3 .
Intermediaries reduce search frictions, effectively making it easier for buyers to find goods on secondary markets, thereby increasing competition with and reducing the amount of value captured by primary good sellers.
We argue that whichever of these two effects dominates determines whether the primary market firm is the beneficiary or the victim of a reduction in frictions due to entry of additional intermediaries in secondary markets. Specifically, we argue that the added value effect will dominate the cannibalization effect in situations where the primary and secondary markets are separated. As we detail below, market separation is more likely to occur when a good is valuable and rare (Barney 1991) , leading to demand outstripping supply. For example, when capacity to meet demand in the primary market is limited in such a way that a good is likely to sell out, primary market firms benefit from entry of intermediaries in downstream secondary markets. On the other hand, when the good is unlikely to sell out, either because of slack capacity or low demand, the primary market firm is harmed by the entry of an intermediary.
We examine these ideas using data on prices in the concert ticket industry. This industry has a number of advantages for investigating our question. First, there is large heterogeneity in popularity across artists as well as heterogeneity in venue capacity, which provides variation in the degree to which the product is valuable and rare. Second, for a number of institutional reasons we describe below, tickets tend to be underpriced in the primary market, leading to an active secondary market. Third, we are able to take advantage of temporal and geographical variation in entry by Craigslist, a prominent Internet intermediary on which many tickets are resold. The quasi-exogenous entry of Craigslist into different markets at different times allows us to implement a difference-in-differences empirical research design robust to secular trends.
We find that, on average, entry of Craigslist into a market is associated with a ticket price increase of nearly $3 for the same artist 4 . The average is not consistent across all shows, however. Shows by artists with lower popularity in a given year exhibit a significant decrease in prices. Artists with the greatest popularity exhibit a significant increase in prices. To further confirm that these effects are driven by the hypothesized mechanism, we show that the results are moderated by the prevalence of Internet usage and the legality of ticket resale (scalping).
Moreover, we observe that promoters, regardless of the level of popularity of their artists, strategically try to limit venue capacity in periods following Craigslist's entry. This finding further corroborates the idea that benefits in the form of higher prices will accrue to firms that offer products that are valuable and rare.
This study contributes to two distinct literatures. Mahoney (2005) and Mahoney and Qian (2012) suggest that frictions can be used to explain the two fundamental questions in strategy:
why firms exist and why they experience heterogeneous performance. Chatain and Zemsky (2011) use a value-based strategy approach to formally model friction reduction. They show how frictions contribute to levels of heterogeneity in performance. We extend this literature on frictions by discussing the effect of reduction in frictions in downstream secondary markets on upstream firms in the primary market. We decompose the net effect of this reduction in frictions in secondary markets into two effects: the added value and cannibalization effects. We provide predictions about how these two effects together affect the distribution of rents in the upstream primary market. Moreover, whereas much of the value-based strategy approach is theoretical, we are able to take our predictions to data. Thus, we not only build on existing theoretical work on value-based strategy, but also show the value of such an approach to testing hypotheses.
We also add to a literature on intermediation that sits at the intersection of Economics, Finance and Strategy. Intermediaries remedy market imperfections that may arise from information asymmetries (Stigler 1962) or institutional voids (Khanna and Palepu 1999 , Ricart et al 2004 . While in principle intermediaries reduce search costs, thereby facilitating trade between buyers and sellers (Spulber 1996 (Spulber , 2007 , there may be conditions under which intermediaries manipulate the search process so as to capture more value for themselves (Hagiu and Jullien 2011) . We add to the literature on intermediaries by describing conditions under which upstream firms benefit or are harmed by downstream intermediaries. Much of the foundational work on intermediaries has focused on the role of financial intermediaries (e.g.: Baumol 1965 , Stoll 1978 , an area in which much of the subsequent work continues to focus (e.g. : Schnatterly, Shaw and Jennings 2007) . Hence, we also add to existing literature by studying intermediation in a different industry: concert tickets. This industry has one of the most visible and controversial resale markets. For example, a 1999 Forbes column labeled the banning of ticket resale one of the ten dumbest ideas of the century (Seligman 1999) . Roth (2007) , on the other hand, labeled ticket resale a "repugnant transaction."
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES
Secondary markets are those in which the focal firm's goods are resold. Secondary markets exist in a wide variety of industries including finance, real estate, electronics, books, and automobiles, among others. Because buyers and sellers of goods in the secondary market are often diffuse, it can be hard for a prospective buyer to find a seller, leading to high search costs (Stigler 1962) .
Intermediaries in these markets help reduce search frictions between buyers and sellers.
Secondary markets can experience varying degrees of "thickness" depending on whether intermediaries enter or exit the secondary market. Changes in the secondary market can have different effects on firms in the primary market. We decompose the net effects into two
individual effects: what we call the "added value," and cannibalization effects.
Added-value effect
The added-value effect of secondary markets describes customers' increased value for a product when they know that they will be able to resell the firm's product at some point in the future. A number of noncooperative game theory (NGT) models demonstrate this effect (Miller 1974 , Hendel and Lizzeri 1999 , Ghose, Telang and Krishnan 2005 , Schiraldi and Nava 2012 .
Chevalier and Goolsbee (2009) provide an empirical study of this effect in the college textbook market. They show that college students are sufficiently forward looking that they are willing to pay higher prices for current textbooks when they are first released than two year later because they know they will be able to resell the textbooks in a secondary market.
We term the potential increase in value appropriation for primary market firms resulting from entry of an intermediary the "added-value effect" because increasing the customer's valuation for the good increases the added value of the primary market firm. This increases the upper bound on the amount of value the primary market firm can capture. We use the term "added value" from the value-based strategy literature (e.g., Brandenburger and Stuart 1996 , Adner and Zemsky 2006 , Brandenburger and Stuart 2007 can also be thought of as the elimination of the classic newsvendor problem (e.g., Eeckhoudt, Gollier and Schlesinger 1995, Schweitzer and Cachon 2000) . In the typical set up to this problem, the newsvendor faces uncertain demand for a product. If the newsvendor orders too many newspapers, he risks not selling them and losing money. If he orders too few newspapers, he risks selling out early, and not making as much money as he could. The presence of a secondary market, where the product can be easily resold, helps reduce this risk.
Cannibalization effect
While the added value effect of the secondary markets increase firms' ability to capture more value in the primary markets, the secondary markets can also cannibalize sales in the primary markets. Firms in the primary markets do not directly capture any value from transactions in the secondary markets and a customer who obtains a product from the secondary market is likely a lost customer of the firm in the primary market. To ensure its product in the primary market stays competitive, a focal firm often has to lower its price to compete effectively against secondary market sellers of its own product. Coase (1972) introduced this effect conjecturing that a durable goods monopolist could not charge monopoly prices because of the secondary market. This effect has received significant attention in theoretical literature (e.g. Bulow 1982 ). The cannibalization effect has also received some attention empirically. For example, Ghose, Telang, and Krishnan (2005) show that the inability to exercise inter-temporal price discrimination exacerbates the cannibalization effect.
The value-based strategy literature provides good intuition for why this effect leads to a decrease in price. The focal firm now faces a competitor offering the same product. A focal firm adds less value to a negotiation if there is another vendor selling a comparable product. A lower added value implies that the maximum value the focal firm can capture is now lower. The intuition is that the buyer is now able to play the focal firm and competitor off against each other to bargain prices down.
The added value effect provides an opportunity for producers to appropriate more value because more value is being created. The cannibalization effect reduces their ability to appropriate value by reducing the focal firm's added value. The two effects may co-exist. In fact both effects were discussed in the debate over the introduction of Amazon's Marketplace, its market for secondhand goods. 6 Primary market suppliers were worried that products from thirdparty sellers would cannibalize their sales, while Amazon argued that the introduction of the secondary market would make visitors more willing to purchase products as they could easily resell these products, creating value for the suppliers.
Hypotheses
The thickening of the secondary market from entry of an intermediary will have different net effects on the focal firm depending on which of the two effects dominates. Which of the two dominates, depends on the degree of substitutability of the focal firms' goods available on the primary and secondary markets. Secondary markets lead to cannibalization when a potential buyer can acquire the focal firm's good either from the focal firm itself or from the secondary market. In this case the buyer is able to play the focal firm and the sellers in the secondary markets off against each other to bargain down price. Hence, a necessary condition for the cannibalization effect is that the primary and secondary markets are both options for the buyer. If the primary and secondary markets are separated, however, then the buyer is not able to play the sellers off against each other and there is no cannibalization. This suggests that the added value effect will dominate when markets are separated.
There are a number of ways for primary and secondary markets to be separated, including geographical, temporal, and regulatory separation. For example, separation could arise when goods are resold sufficiently far from the primary market that arbitrage across the two markets is impractical. Separation can also arise when demand quickly outstrips supply, which might occur when a good is valuable and rare (Barney 1991) . When this happens, goods in the primary market sell out before a secondary market has time to develop. In such a case, the two markets are separated. Entry of an intermediary into the secondary market will "thicken" the secondary market, meaning that a customer who wants to sell a product on the secondary market will have an easier time locating a buyer. This reduces the risk that a customer who buys a valuable and rare good on the primary market will be stuck with the good if it turns out she is not able to use
it. In such a case the customer will be able to easily resell the good on the secondary market.
This increases the number of customers' willing to purchase the good in the primary market, effectively bidding up the price for which the firm is able to sell the good (Lippman and Rumelt 2003) . Firms selling valuable and rare goods in the primary market should therefore be able to charge a higher price for their goods, and, therefore, will be beneficiaries of a thicker secondary market.
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Hypothesis 1: Firms' ability to appropriate value in the primary market will increase for valuable and rare products upon entry of an intermediary in the secondary market.
When the primary and secondary markets are not separated, however, the goods available on the primary and secondary markets are close substitutes for each other. This happens, for example, when there is abundant supply in the primary market. We expect the cannibalization effect to come into play in such cases. Customers who anticipate a secondary market to emerge may be willing to wait to purchase goods on the secondary market. As the goods continue to be available in the primary market, the price in the primary market serves as a cap for the one in the secondary market. As a result, sellers in the secondary market will have to sell the goods below the cost. In particular, sellers could be willing to price significantly below the cost to increase their likelihood of recovering some of their investments when the goods depreciate quickly. 8 Hence, secondary market may not only prevent primary market vendors from capitalizing on the value added effect, but may in fact drive prices down for the non-popular goods, all else equal. 9 7 Our prediction that higher popularity goods will suffer less cannibalization from the secondary market shares some resemblance with predictions that firms higher quality brands will suffer less cannibalization from other products in their product lines (De Figueiredo and Kyle 2006) . They are quite different, however. The cannibalization we describe is of the same product later and the mechanism requires market separation. 8 Imagine for example a coffee shop that buys baked goods from a nearby bakery to resell. Because the baked goods become less desirable over time, the coffee shop may be willing to sell them below cost the next day before they become inedible. Some customers may be willing to purchase the day-old goods from the coffee shop over fresh goods from the bakery at the right price. 9 Note that if the firm selling on the primary market were able to perfectly factor in the demand for the good then all goods would have the same probability of selling out, and we would observe no variation in effect. However there are many reasons why firm's prices will not be perfect. These include demand adjusting faster than prices, exogenous price restrictions like those in the concert industry (Courty 2003 , Seabrook 2009 , Leslie and Sorenson 2012 , or the simple fact that pricing is very difficult and mistakes are common (Dutta, Zbaracki, and Bergen, 2003) .
Hypothesis 2: Firms' ability to appropriate value in the primary market will decrease for nonvaluable products with slack supply upon entry of an intermediary in the secondary market.
The effects we describe in the two hypotheses above assume that firms in the primary markets could only adjust their prices following entry of an intermediary in the secondary market. When firms' resources are not fixed or are imitable, it is reasonable to expect them to adopt other new strategies as well, especially if such firms are adversely affected by the entry (Peteraf 1993, Peteraf and Barney 2003) . These new strategies will attempt to change the value and rarity of their products so as to create separation of the primary and secondary markets.
There is a range of possible strategies that might achieve this end. Given some degree of nonimitable resource heterogeneity (Peteraf 1993) , we expect that for most firms in most industries, it is easier to change the rarity of their product, rather than the value of the product. At a minimum, a firm could restrict its output capacity by, for example, destroying some of its output to achieve rarity, a technique known as "destroy and discard" in the apparel industry.
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Hypothesis 3: Firms in the primary market will elect to produce lower quantities upon entry of an intermediary in the secondary market.
We note, however, that firms in the primary market may be slow to change their existing strategies. For example, routines, once institutionalized, may be difficult to change, leading to organizational rigidities when faced with market shocks (Leonard-Barton 1992, Kaplan and Henderson 2005, Rawley 2010) .
EMPIRICAL SETTING
We test these hypotheses within the context of the US concert industry. There are many features of the concert industry that make it an ideal laboratory for studying the hypothesized effects from entry of an intermediary. Artists are of heterogeneous popularity, and the artists "quality"-the popularity of his or her songs-is not necessarily a choice variable. Seats available at concerts are not perfectly adjustable to demand because each market has few venues and the sizes are The combination of these factors mean that we can observe shows with a variety of probabilities of selling out, and therefore different balances of the added value and cannibalization effects.
This unique setting allows us, therefore, to explore the features that determine which firms will benefit from reduced frictions in the secondary market. Below, we describe the functioning of the concert industry.
The concert industry 12
The impetus for a concert is usually a promoter. The promoter selects an artist and negotiates with the artist the split of revenues and the ticket price for the event. The promoter then rents a venue at which the concert will take place. The structure of the rent distribution is typically as follows. Artists typically receive an "advance" from the promoter. Imagine, for example, that the band receives an advance of $100,000. This means the artist is paid $100,000 immediately, with that advance corresponding to the first $100,000 in ticket revenue. The next block of revenue is allocated to the promoter's "guaranteed profit." This might be $50,000 for expenses and $20,000 for profit. After this threshold, namely $170,000, is met the artist and the promoter split the remaining revenue. This is commonly on the order of about 80% to the artist, with the promoter receiving the rest. Venues are generally paid a fixed rental fee and earn all of the proceeds from concessions and parking. Artists also typically keep all of the proceeds from merchandise sales, though sometimes they compensate the venue a percentage for permission to sell on the premises.
The mechanics of ticketing are handled by a ticketing provider. Venues select ticketing providers and typically enter long-term contracts. Tickets are generally distributed through the venue's box office, the ticketing provider's website, and some tickets are distributed directly to the promoter and artists. Regardless of how tickets are distributed, tickets are often resold in the secondary market. This can occur either because ticket buyers decide that they can no longer attend the concert, because the tickets are bought with the intention of reselling them, or because the tickets are released directly onto the secondary market by an artist or promoter.
Historically, much of the secondary market exchange took place through brokers or in person in front of the venue the day of the show (Seabrook 2009 ). Since the late 1990s, the secondary market has increasingly migrated online, and occurs either through a secondary market website owned by the primary ticketing vendor (e.g.: TicketsNow), third party websites specifically for ticket resale (e.g. StubHub), or Craigslist.
Craigslist
Craigslist.org is a website that specializes in online classified listings. Craigslist is the leading classified-ad service in any medium. Among the products advertised on Craigslist are event tickets. There are so many event tickets offered for sale on Craigslist that the company has specific rules regarding event ticket
listings. 16 Indeed, the popular press has wondered whether Craigslist would drive scalpers out of business. 17 It is important to point out, however, that Craigslist does not make money from ticket resale 18 and thus Craigslist is unlikely to choose to enter markets based on the characteristics of ticket sales in the local market. Thus, it is reasonable to assume that entry of Craigslist into a market is exogenous with respect to ticket resale dynamics.
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DATA
Sample
The primary data were obtained from three sources. A set of data on concerts was obtained from 19 We provide some analysis to confirm this in the "Robustness" section.
Pollstar Magazine, the industry magazine of the live entertainment industry. Data from Pollstar
Magazine has been used in other studies of the concert industry, including Krueger (2005) and
Mortimer, Nosko, and Sorensen (Forthcoming), which describe the representativeness of the sample. In this data set, each observation is a single concert. For each concert, the data include the date of the show, the total revenue from the show, the number of tickets sold, the capacity of the venue for that particular show, the name of the venue, the name of the headliner, the promoters, a classification of the artist 20 , and the headliner's management company. Our data window is from 2003 through 2008; we choose this time period because of data availability and overlap with our main independent variable post craigslist entry described below.
To ensure that concerts in our data set are comparable to each other, we restrict the data set to focus on major concerts in the US. First, we restrict the data to shows at venues with addresses in the United States. We then remove acts that are too frequently categorized as "Comedy", "Theatrical", "Family entertainment", or "Lecture." As described below, our empirical strategy relies on a difference-in-differences research design that uses artist fixed effect. Hence, we also restrict the data to shows with headliners that performed at least 25 shows during the sample window. This removes one-off events like fairs and festivals or artists that were not actively touring, and provides us with enough artist observations before and after Craigslist entry to estimate the effect of entry.
In our final dataset, we have 1304 artists, each of which performed 56.5 shows, on average. We include 12,281.7 shows, on average, in each year between 2003 and 2008.
Dependent variables
20 These types include genres like "Pop/Rock" and "Rap/Hip hop" as well as "Family Entertainment" which includes things like ice shows and "Comedy" which includes large stand-up acts.
We use ticket prices to capture firms' ability to appropriate value in the primary market and investigate the impact on ticket prices of the entry of Craigslist. Prices are an important object of interest because, under certain conditions, they can be thought of as representing the value split between the seller and the customer on a given transaction (Bennett, Forthcoming) . If the price is very close to the maximum the customer was willing to pay, she receives very little value from the transaction, leaving the largest share of valueto the seller. If the price is very close to the minimum the seller was willing to offer, the customer has captured the majority of the value and left the seller with very little.
We construct our main dependent variable mean price as total revenues divided by the total number of tickets sold for the show. We also use two additional dependent variables from the dataset: venue capacity and sellout, which indicates if the venue sold out for a given show.
Independent variables
Our main independent variable is post craigslist entry, a dummy variable which takes the value of one for all years after Craigslist has entered the county in which the concert venue is located.
This data was hand-collected from craigslist.org and has been used in studies of Craigslist's impact in other settings, including the newspaper industry (Seamans and Zhu 2012) and job search (Kroft and Pope Forthcoming).
We also collect the number of Wikipedia revisions to an artist's page in a given year as a measure of her popularity. Wikipedia is the largest web-based free encyclopedia and is the sixth- Table 1 .
RESULTS
Main Results
The ideal experiment for achieving our goal would be to randomly assign thicker secondary markets to a random sample of concerts. As this experiment is not feasible, we attempt to replicate it in an observational study. We interpret the entry of Craigslist, which for the purposes of this study is plausibly exogenous (Seamans and Zhu 2012, Kroft and Pope Forthcoming) as a shock to the thickness of the secondary market for concert tickets. Craigslist's entry was staggered over time and did not occur in all of our markets. This allows us to identify the difference robust to secular trends.
Our base specification is a difference-in-differences design. We regress mean prices for concert i, for artist a, in geographic area s, in year t on an indicator for whether the show occurred after the entry of Craigslist in the focal market and a set of controls. The controls include the number of revisions to the Wikipedia page for the headlining artist in the current year, as well as fixed effects for the headlining artist, two-digit ZIP code, and year. Standard errors are clustered at the artist level.
(1)
MEAN PRICE iast = α + β*POST CRAIGSLIST ENTRY st + γ*CONTROLS ast +ε
Model 1 of Table 2 presents the results of estimating equation 1. There is no main effect of craigslist entry at conventional levels. Our prediction, however, was that craigslist would have an effect on the most popular artists. In Model 2 of Table 2 , we add a measure of popularity and we see that this appears to be the case.
The results suggest that prices were roughly 36% more sensitive to artist popularity after the entry of Craigslist 28 . Before the entry of Craigslist an increase in popularity of one standard deviation was associated with an increase of mean ticket price of about $0.99 29 . After
Craigslist's entry, it was associated with an increase of $1.34 30 . At a show of average size, that amounts to a revenue increase of $4,489.70.
The models above assume a linear effect of popularity. We next relax this assumption and regress mean price on a cubic of log revisions separately for shows that took place before the entry, and then after. Figure 1 presents the regression predicted prices of shows by whether they occurred after the entry of Craigslist in the local market or not. 31 Figure 1 suggests that Craigslist had a negative effect on prices of artists with less popularity, those below 650 revisions 32 . Price increased significantly for artists with greater than 650 revisions. This is consistent with the theory that suggests that it is for shows likely to sell out that a thicker secondary market allows promoters to raise prices in the primary market.
We next provide evidence that the effect is driven by the propensity for shows to sell out.
To do this, we estimate a logistic regression model on sellout, an indicator for selling all of the available tickets. The independent variables in this model are a cubic for show capacity, a cubic for revisions, an indicator for whether the show took place during the Summer months, and fixed 28 .000936/.00259=.36 29 The standard deviation of our revisions measure is 382. 382*.0026=.989 30 382*(.0026+.0009)=1.34 31 The regression results are available in an appendix. 32 The negative effect appears to be for artists with ln(revisions) <6.5 => revisions<650. effects at the year, 2-digit ZIP, and artist levels. We then predict the probability that a show will sell out and collapse that into buckets of ten percentage points each. Figure 2 depicts the coefficients on the interactions of dummies for being in each of the buckets and a dummy for being post craigslist entry. 33 The point at the 90% decile indicates a positive and significant increase in price for shows with a greater than 90% predicted probability of selling out from the entry of Craigslist. The results add support for the prediction that the effect of Craigslist was negative for the shows least likely to sell out and strongly positive for those that were quite likely to sell out.
Hypothesis 3 suggests that firms will respond to the entry of the intermediary and attempt to adjust capacity. In our setting, that would manifest as having the same artist, in the same city in the same year play a smaller venue. To evaluate Hypothesis 3, we regress capacity for concert i, for artist a, in geographic area s, in year t arranged by promoter p on an indicator for whether the show occurred after the entry of Craigslist in the focal market and a set of controls. The controls include the number of revisions to the Wikipedia page for the headlining artist in the current year, as well as fixed effects for the promoter, two-digit ZIP code, and year. Standard errors are allowed to cluster at the promoter level.
(2) CAPACITY iapst = α + β*POST CRAIGSLIST ENTRY st + γ*CONTROLS apst +ε
Model 1 of Table 3 presents the results of estimating equation 2. Controlling for popularity of the artist, the city, and the promoter, we observe a trend towards smaller venues after the entry of Craigslist. Specifically, we see the average artist playing a venue with about 500 fewer seats. This is consistent with promoters attempting to separate the markets to get the 33 The regression results will be made available in an online appendix.
benefits of the value added effect without facing the cannibalization associated with a thickened secondary market. This shift towards smaller venues also decreases ancillary revenue associated with larger shows (e.g., concessions, parking, etc.). Because the specification in Table 6 include promoter fixed effects, they absorb any effects associated with the few large vertically integrated promoters, those who own venues.
Robustness Tests
Craigslist Entry
To verify our claim that Craigslist's entry is exogenous for our purposes, we estimate a discretetime probit model predicting Craigslist's entry into a market. 
Internet Access
Our theory suggested that the increase in price is due to a thickening of the secondary market.
Specifically, users with access to the Internet might now be more likely to participate in the secondary market. If this were the case, the greatest effect would be found in regions with greater use of the Internet. In Table 5 we present models including our measure of Internet access. Model 1 of Table 5 demonstrates that the predicted interaction between craigslist entry and Wikipedia revisions is robust to controlling for Internet access. Model 2 of Table 5 repeats   the regression from Table 2, 
StubHub
StubHub is an online secondary ticket market. Similar to Craigslist, StubHub made their site available for use in different markets at different times. However, StubHub's business is the resale sale of tickets, so we cannot consider their entry exogenous with respect to ticket price responses as we do with Craigslist. To verify the generality of our findings, we hand-collected information on StubHub's entry into different markets by searching historical versions of www.stubhub.com on the Internet Archive. We create post stubhub entry, a dummy variable which takes the value of one for all years after StubHub has entered the county in which the concert venue is located. We repeat the analysis for the entry of StubHub. Models 1 and 2 of Table 6 recreate Models 1 and 2 of Table 2 , but using the entry of StubHub as the treatment instead of the entry of Craigslist. As with Craigslist, after StubHub enters prices are higher for the most popular artists. Models 3 and 4 of Table 6 replicate Models 2 and 3 of Table 5 . As with Craigslist, the effect associated with StubHub is greatest in areas with higher Internet penetration. Figure 3 replicates Figure 2 , but again using StubHub's entry in place of Craigslist's. 34 The results are qualitatively similar, leading to lower prices for shows less likely to sell out and higher prices, though weakly identified, for the shows most likely to sell out.
Legality of scalping/resale
We also investigate the sensitivity of our observed effect to local ticket resale ---or "scalping"---laws. Model 1 of Table 7 suggests that the price decrease associated with scalping prohibition is less after the entry of Craigslist. If scalpers consider Craigslist to be a venue in which they can resell tickets with less risk than doing so in person in front of the venue, they may be willing to break the law of the resale prohibiting states. In other words, Craigslist has a greater effect on the secondary market in states that had prohibited resale. Model 2 is fully interacted. There is no evidence, at conventional levels, that the interaction between popularity and Craigslist entry differs by whether the state prohibits ticket resale.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
The recent focus on frictions by Strategy scholars (Mahoney 2005, Mahoney and Qian, 34 The regression results will be made available in an online appendix Forthcoming) raises the question of which firms are able to benefit from the reduction in those frictions. In this paper, we provide theoretical predictions and empirically test those predictions.
We look, specifically, at when reduced frictions thicken a secondary market for a firm's goods.
We suggest that the firms that are able to separate the primary and secondary markets will actually increase value appropriation from these friction reductions. Firms who do not do so, and therefore have their goods cannibalized by the secondary market, will actually see a decrease in their value appropriation.
We test these predictions using a difference-in-differences model. Our treatment is the exogenous entry of Craigslist to different geographic markets at different times. Craigslist serves as an intermediary and reduces frictions in the secondary market for concert tickets. We find support for our predictions and further test their interpretation by testing for moderation from
Internet access and scalping laws. Hence, our results provide a first step towards understanding firms' heterogeneous ability to appropriate value when there is a change in search frictions in the market.
These results have powerful implications for managers. With the proliferation of intermediaries on the Internet, it is inevitably that many firms' products are actively being resold online. While many firms perceive these secondary markets as potential threats to their ability to appropriate value and have sought to eliminate this possibility through leasing contracts, warranties that only apply to first buyers, or contractual prohibition of resale, our results suggest that firms may could potentially benefit from the secondary market if they could separate their first and secondary markets. Our study shows that product popularity and availability affect this separation. Therefore, after the emergence of a secondary market firms in the primary market can strategically influence their product popularity and availability to capture more value.
In our setting, firms in the primary market do not benefit from the secondary market.
When firms generate profits from product resale in the secondary market, the cannibalization effects will be weaker. Our theory would suggest that they are likely to benefit more from the reduction of search frictions in the secondary markets. Indeed, Amazon has adopted a number of practices to make it easy for third-party sellers to sell used books on its site. Hence, rather than seeking to eliminate the secondary market, firms may find it beneficial to create a secondary market by themselves.
Two limitations of this study are important to emphasize. First, our setting, while providing features like constrained capacity, restrictions against perfect pricing, and complete depreciation that allow for reliable identification, is not representative of all secondary markets.
Future work replicating these results in other settings will help verify their sensitivity to the features of this market. Second, firms in the primary markets may consider other possible strategies such as lobbying for regulatory intervention to separate their markets from the secondary markets. These strategies could be important considerations for certain settings. Above average no. broadband ISPs refers to shows in county years In which the county has more than the average number of ISPs offering service of >200kbps in that year. 
